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Recent Cases
ADVERSE POSSESSION-SUFFICIENCY OF CONDUCT TO
AMOUNT TO POSSESSION
Marvel v. Barley Millroad Homes, Inc.'
Plaintiff and defendant were owners of adjoining land. In an equitable action
for declaratory judgment, and to remove cloud on title,' "legal ownership" of
.63 acre of "stream and woodland" lying between their respective parcels was
held to be in plaintiff by having "established open, notorious and hostile possession
of the disputed property for a period of more than twenty years." Defendant's
predecessor in title had conveyed by deed on May 25, 1916, certain other adjoining
land to the plaintiff's predecessor, the .63 acre not being described therein, but
thought to be included by the plaintiff's predecessor. No fence was constructed
on the actual boundary line, although there was an oral agreement prior to the
conveyance to do so. The court accepted plaintiff's evidence to the effect that a
fence (which separated the grantor's land from that claimed by plaintiff) was
built in 1916 pursuant to the agreement on an erroneous line.
The court held the following acts to warrant a holding that title was in the
plaintiff: (1) Plaintiff's predecessor, persuant to an agreement with neighbors,
laid out a bridle path on the disputed property over which plaintiff, plaintiff's
predecessor (plaintiff's father), and defendant's predecessor had ridden;" (2) the
"use" of the property "including an agreement. . .to erect a fence, [and] the
erection of a fence" on the disputed line,' while no fence was on the line mentioned

1. 104 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 1954).
2. There seems little question as to equitable jurisdiction. On declaratory
judgments in general, see DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 10, § 6501 (1953), and with respect
to title to realty, see notes 68 A.L.R. 110 (1930) ; 50 A.L.R. 42 (1927) ; 19 A.L.R.
1124 (1922); 12 A.L.R. 52 (1921). On suits to quiet title in adverse possessor,
see Jackson v. Wax, 20 Del. Ch. 93, 171 Atl. 755 (1934) ; Shaw, Equity Jurisdiction
to Remove Cloud on Title by Adverse Possession, 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 475 (1942),
citing authorities; 3 Am. LAW OF PROP. § 15.2 n. 3 (1952). The court (note 1
supra at 914) raises the only doubt saying such issues are generally tried at law.
See Green v. Cowgil, 30 Del. Ch. 345, 61 A.2d 410 (1948); DEL. CODE ANN., tit.
10, §§ 6503, 369 (1953); Notes 87 A.L.R. 1218 (1933); 68 A.L.R. 119 (1930); 12
A.L.R. 72 (1921). Generally also, see 3 AM. LAw OF PROP. §§ 13.16, 18.65 n. 123
(1952). But see, Wolfman v. Jablonski, 99 A.2d 494 (Del. Ch. 1953).
3. Apparently such use for neighborhood amusement stopped in 1924, and
ceased entirely in 1930, upon the death of the plaintiff's father, see note 1 supra
at 910.
4. The fence did not (at least at time of this suit) completely separate the
land in question from other lands of defendant and his predecessors. It ran at an
angle to and stopped 12-14 feet north of the northern fence line of property to
the south of the lands of plaintiff and defendant. Whether this opening existed
was controverted, and the court placed emphasis on there being "a post on the
(296)
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in the deed; (3) the hauling of fallen trees from the disputed land; (4) the
posting of the land against hunting; (5) "the efforts to establish a game preserve" on the land;' and (6) "the use of property generally by plaintiffs and their
predecessors in title in the same manner as the adjoining property of plaintiff's"
was used.' These six items amount to "ownership by right of possession" of the
land in dispute although "there are no improvements, no occupancy by the
claimants, and no tilling of the soil."'
"Adverse possession" is generally used as a "convenient ellipsis for such
possession as will ripen into title through the running of the statute of limitations."' Presently' its basis"0 is a statutory denial"2 to an owner of his action
of ejectment" where a certain number of years have passed since his cause of

line separating the disputed property from the property of the owner of the land
to the south, in line with a post at the end of the line separating the disputed
property from property of defendant." Plaintiff claimed a gate to be at this
point. Defendant claimed that the fence line turned at this point to the West
forming a 12-14 feet wide lane into another part of his property. 104 A.2d 908 at
910-911 (Del. Oh. 1954).
5. Not further described in the opinion, nor reference made to when such
efforts were made. In fact the only dates mentioned occurred with reference to
note 3, supra,and note 7, infra.
6. 104 A.2d 908 at 912 (Del. Oh. 1954). With reference to (6) no indication
is given as to what use plaintiffs made of adjoining property, nor as to what use
was made by other owners in the vicinity of their property (except, of course,
the bridle paths). See note 7 infra.
7. The court holds defendant's predecessor to have been divested of his
title as of 1936, and that acts of entry by him or his agents for water from a
stream thereon for his stock could not affect possession of plaintiff's predecessors
since these acts apparently occurred in 1937-1938.
8. Fuller, Adverse Possession, Occupancy of Another's Land Under Mistake as to Location of a Boundary, 7 OR. L. Rnv. 329, n. 2 (1928). The phrase
was apparently first used by Lord Mansfield in Taylor d. Atkyns v. Horde, 1 Burr.
60, 119 (1757); Bordwell, Seisin and Disseisin, 34 HARV. L. REV. 592, 717, at
623, n. 326 (1921).
9. Historically, see 3 Am. LAw OF PROP. § 15.1; Ballantine, Title By Adverse
Possession,32 HAIv. L. REV. 135 (1918) ; Bordwell, Disseisin and Adverse Possession, 33 YALE L. J. 141 (1923); 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPFaTY §§ 1132-1133 (3d ed.
1939).
10. The underlying purpose of the statutes is differently interpreted. See,
for example 3 AM. LAw OF PROP. § 15.2 n. 1, p. 759 (1952), and compare with
Ballantine (op. cit. supra note 9, at p. 143) in respect to the statutes of the
several states: ".

.

.under

our crude conveyancing and recording systems this

doctrine is indispensable to just titles."
11. For a good survey and comparison of the English and U.S. statutes with
their varying requirements, see Taylor, Titles to Land by Adverse Possession, 20
IA. L. Ruv. 551, 738 (1935).
12. The Delaware statute (Dam. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7901) reads: "No person
shall make an entry into any lands, tenements, or hereditements, but within
twenty years next after his right or title to the same first descended or accrued."
See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7902. Many states have differently worded
statutes, with added provisions, Taylor, op. cit. suprc, note 11. The instant case
refers to no statute.
13. Ballantine, op. cit. supranote 9 at pp. 193-140 (especially notes 20 and 22).
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action arose, at the same time extinguishing his title and creating non-record 1 '
title in the "adverse possessor" by operation of the common law.1
"The essential elements of adverse possession probably reduce themselves to
three. (1) Possession must be entered into and maintained for the statutory
period. (2) The possession must operate to give the owner of the land a cause
of action [or the power of securing one by mere demand]."' (3) The possession
must be 'unaccompanied by any recognition, express or inferable from circumstances, of the right' of the owner."7
Certainly there is no easy definition of possession."8 Two general meanings,
however, seem agreed upon and pertinent: "(1) Possession as the facts which
initiate legal control. . .[usually called] 'de facto possession', 'physical possession', or 'actual possession'. . . . (2) Possession as the facts which must accompany a continuing legal control as, for example, in the statement that an
adverse possessor must continue in open, notorious,"0 etc., possession ...
[usually expressed] 'actual possession', or to say in regard to a person's factual

14. See Ferrier, The Recording Acts and Titles by Adverse Possession and
Prescription,14 CALIF. L. REV. 287 (1926).
1
15. See 3 Aau. LAw oF PROP. § 15.2 n. 3 (1952); Ballantine, op. cit. supra,
note 13; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 9, § 1134 n.12.
16. This entire quoted passage comes from Fuller, op. cit. supra note 8, at pp.
329-330, and the bracketed material is Fuller's own modification expressed in his
note 3, p. 330.
17. Element (3) comes from 2 TIFFANY, RmAL PRoPiERTY § 503 (2d ed. 1920),
as adapted by Fuller, op. cit. supra note 8, at p. 330, n. 4. Generally see 3 ADM.
LAw oF PRoP. § 15.2, pp. 762-763: "Adverse possession must necessarily mean
any wrongful possession which subjects the wrongdoer to the action of ejectment,
since the running of the statute barring the real owner's right to maintain that
action and nothing else whatever, brings his title to an end, making the possessory
title of the wrongdoer, which was established against everyone else when the
wrongful possession started, good also against the former rightful owner." The
Delaware courts have held: "Twenty year's possession is a title,"; Arron Pcery's
Lessee v. Joseph Burton, 1 Del. Cases 28, 29 (1794); "Such adverse possession
must be exclusive; hostile to the right of ownership of all others; continued so
for at least twenty years, and must be marked by definite and distinct boundaries
[although not necessarily fences] ;" Inskeep v. Shields, 4 Del. 345, 346 (1845) ;
elements exist when "Possession relied on has been open, notorious, exclusive and
held by fixed and definite boundaries, . ..has been held under claim of right and
has, therefore, been hostile . . .and has continued for, at least, 20 years. ....
"
Delaware Land and Development Co. v. First and Central Presbyterian Church
of Wilmington, Del., 16 Del. Ch. 410, 440, 147 Atl. 165, 178 (1929).
18. See generally, Bingham, The Nature and Importance of Legal Possession,
13 MIcH. L. Rxv. 535, 623 (1915); Shartel, Meanings of Possession, 16 MINN.
L. REv. 611 (1932); 3 Am. LAw oF PRoP. § 15.3 (1952).
19. 3 AM. LAW OF PROP. § 15.3, p. 769 (1952) discusses well this use of
notorious, "The implication that there must be notoriety of possession so as to
acquaint the owner thereof before the statute starts to run is quite untenable if
possession in fact exists, because the owner has the right to maintain ejectment
against such possessor, and the statute starts to run as soon as the cause of
action accrues." See also Fuller, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 330 n. 4.
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relation to a thing, that he is 'in possession', or 'las possession', . . .20 In each
case the nature of the land in dispute is important, i.e., to what "possession"
-does it admit.2 The court's proposed test that if "one goes on the land and
uses it openly and notoriously, as owners of similar lands use their property,
to the exclusion of the true owner" 2 he has done enough, is generally accepted.2
But their statement, "He must intend to hold the land for himself. . ..
It is
the intention that guides the entry and fixes its character", seems unsound."
The real crux of the problem is: Have the plaintiff and his predecessors done anything which has given defendant and his predecessors an action of ejectment
continuously from 1916 until 1936, intention being immaterial."
Building of the fence on the wrong line would perhaps" "initiate legal control" but its continued existence is insufficient to exhibit continued control for
the statutory period.2 ' Laying out and frequent use of the bridal path would
seem to give continuing rise to an action of ejectment" in defendant and his
predecessors but this use apparently stopped in 1930, and alone would be insufficient. Unfortunately the court does not indicate when the other acts of
plaintiff and his predecessors took place. If these acts did not take place between 1930 and 1936, apparently defendant had no cause of action in ejectment
during this period on which the statute could run. If done within this period they
are more like isolated trespasses than acts for which an owner must bring ejectinent or lose his ownership.2 '

20. Shartell, op. cit. supra note 18, at 612-613, n. 3.
21. Shartell, op. cit. supra note 18, at 614 et seq. at 619, "... acts and events
are significant only because, and only to the extent that, our legal order makes
them significant ....
In any particular problem it may be necessary to consider
the competing claims of other capable individuals, . . . and the public peace, the
public welfare, and perhaps many other ends or interests of society. . . . Even
where act and intent are significant... they do not tell the whole story. .
22. Note 1 supra at 911.
23. 3 Am. LAW OF PROP. § 15.3, pp. 765-767, especially n. 4, p. 766.
24. 3 AM. LAw oF PROP. § 15.2, at 762, ". . . the statute runs against the
owner's right of action in ejectment from the time the wrongdoer took possession
irrespective of his mental attitude."
25. See note 24, supra, id., §§ 15.3, p. 765; 15.4, p. 774; 15.5, p. 786, n. 1.
Fuller, op. cit. supra,note 8, at 330, n. 3.
26. However, the fence in question (if built under the agreement of the
parties) being the southern one-half, was erected and maintained by the defendants and their predecessors, note 1, supra at 910. Apparently the court had an
easier basis for decision than under the doctrine of adverse possession. See DEL.
CODm ANN., tit. 25, § 1106, "If any line, or boundaries are ascertained and fixed
by agreement of parties they shall not be disturbed by any commission as between
the parties. . .

.";

and Lindsay v. Springer, 4 Har. 547, 4 Del. 547 (1847). Note

that "possession" to the mutually set line would seem to be of a different type
than the continuous "possession" required of an adverse possessor.
27. See 3 Am. LAw OF PROP. § 15.3 b "Marking Limits of Occupcncy or Use,"
p. 770.
28. But see Doe ex dem Standifier v. Styles, 185 Ala. 550, 64 So. 345 (1914).
29. 3 Am. LAw OF PROP. § 15.3, p. 767, n. 8 (1952).
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It would seem, that in holding the acts of plaintiff and his predecessor to
amount to adverse possession for the requisite period, the court aligned itself with
jurisdictions" finding "adverse possession" to exist without first having established
from the facts sufficient initiation or continuance of control to say that the
claimant was ever possessed of the land. 1
JOHN F. STAPLETON

CONTRACTS-THE LEGAL EFFECT OF A GRATUITOUS ORDER
Wolters Village Management Company v. The Merchants and
Planters National Bank'
The defendant, a general contractor, entered into a contract with the subcontractor, Central Electric Company, whereby it agreed to pay $60,500 in return
for certain electrical work. Thereafter Central wrote to the defendant saying,
"We wish to extend an assignment of all moneys" to the building project "to
Merchants and Planters National Bank, Sherman Texas.... All checks for gross
amount of contract $60,500 shall be made jointly payable to the Merchants and
Planters National Bank and Central Electric Company." The defendant agreed
to do so by accepting and signing the letter.
The subcontractor showed this letter to the plaintiff bank named in the letter
and received a loan of $20,000. The defendant made none of the checks jointly
payable; they were all made payable solely to the order of Central, and some
were negotiated by Central to creditors or for cash, and no part of these amounts
was applied to the bank loan. Central defaulted on its payments to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover the unpaid
balance of the loan. The court considered the letter in question to be merely a
request for permission to assign the contract rights of Central to the plaintiff.

30. See 1954 ANNUAL SURvEY OF AMERICAN LAW 755, n. 27, 30 N.Y.U.
L.Rev. 755 (1954).
31. For a brief summary of Missouri law concerning adverse possession (with
extensive law review citations) see Eckhardt and Peterson, Possessory Estates,
Future Interests and Conveyances in Missouri § 97 (especially note 33), 23
V.A.M.S. 81. Since 1951 see 17 Mo. L. REv. 103-07, 401 (1952) and 18 Mo. L.
Rnv. 380-1 (1953). For some idea of how the Missouri court might rule in
similar cases see Barker v. Allen, 273 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1954), although the
property is residential. Earlier Missouri cases are exemplified by Davis v.
Alexander, 183 S.W. 563 (Mo. 1915) which quotes many cases, including (with
favor at p. 569) McCabe v. Bruere, 153 Mo. 1, 5, 54 S.W. 450, 451 (1899),
1.... if the adjacent property owners each occupied up to a line, but neither so
maintaining it against what might be discovered to be the true line, the possession of neither is adverse to the other."
1. 223 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1955).
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It did not constitute an assignment of the subcontractor's interest. However, the
court held that it did constitute a valid contract between the defendant and Central of which the plaintiff was a donee beneficiary and which the plaintiff could
enforce.
The soundness of the court's decision must rest on the proper interpretation
of the letter in question. Under the original contract, Central had a right to receive $60,500 for the proper performance of its work. The defendant consented
to Central's assignment of such rights. Such consent was unnecessary and was
2
of no legal significance.
Moreover, the letter itself did not amount to an assignment of Central's
contract rights. The fact that Central asked for permission to make an assignment of its rights indicates that it contemplated further action before an assignment would be made. In order to have a valid assignment it is necessary that one
transfer a right to a third person. Obviously further action was contemplated
in this case, namely the securing of a loan from the plaintiff before any assignment was to be made. The mere fact that a creditor gives his debtor authority
8
to pay to another person: does not make the other an assignee.
All that remains in Central's letter to the defendant is an order directing the
defendant to make checks jointly payable to the order of the plaintiff and Central. Is then the legal effect of Central's order to the defendant to make the checks
jointly payable a contract for the benefit of the plaintiff bank? A mere promise
by one person to another for the benefit of a third person will not sustain an
action by the third person.' It has been held that a bank's promise, made after
a deposit, to the holder of the deposit certificate to pay the proceeds to another
is not supported by sufficient consideration and the third party has no cause of
action in the absence of a delivery of the certificate to the third person prior to
the death of the promisee.r An employer's promise to pay insurance premiums
for his employees is merely a gratuitous promise and unenforceable by the
employee's beneficiaries." A promise by a bank to a merchant that the bank
should pay on checks as an overdraft is not supported by sufficient considerAvtion
and the payee of a check in such circumstances has no cause of action against
the bank.'

2. Moore v. Gariglietti, 228 Ill. 143, 81 N.E. 826 (1907) ; Sickles v. Lauman,
185 Iowa 37, 169 N.W. 670 (1918); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 151 (1932).
1 3. Holbrook v. Payne, 151 Mass. 383, 24 N.E. 210 (1890); Structural Gypsum Company v. National Commercial Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co., 105
N.J. Eq. 424, 148 Atl. 199 (1929).
4. Myerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 217 Ala. 153, 115 So. 94 (1927) ; Hicks
v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 495, 46 S.W. 432 (1898) ; 12 AM. JuR. 842, § 289.
P. Clark v. Young, 246 Ala. 529, 21 So.2d 331 (1944).
6. Myerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., supra note 4.
7. Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Talley, 222 Ala. 442, 132 So. 871 (1930).
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Central gave nothing in exchange for the defendant's making the checks
jointly payable to itself and the plaintiff. It certainly did not contemplate relinquishing its rights to the proceeds until it had received a loan from the plaintiff. It was a gratuitous promise on the part of the defendant. As a result,
there is only one contract involved and that is the original contract between
Central and the defendant, of which the plaintiff was not made a beneficiary and
which therefore should not be enforceable by the plaintiff.
ELDm STERNBERO

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DIVORCE-RECRIMINATION AND
COMPARATIVE FAULT IN MISSOURI
Eikermann v. Eikerrnann
In this case the trial court awarded a divorce to the wife on the ground of
indignities. There was evidence that her husband forced her to have an abortion,
did not support her and cursed her and their children. The decree was reversed
on appeal and a divorce awarded to the husband on evidence that the wife had
refused intercourse, had committed adultery and had cursed her husband. The
opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals did not mention the familiar Missouri
doctrine of recrimination. It stated:'
"The equities appear to have been with the plaintiff [husband] and
from all of the foregoing it seems that the cross bill should have been
dismissed and the decree granted to him."
Very briefly, the doctrine of recrimination denies a divorce decree to a
spouse who has given the other grounds for divorce. It allows a divorce only to
one who is an innocent and injured party.*
In this case the evidence was so strong on both sides that the trial court
awarded a divorce to the wife on the testimony while the appellate court awarded
a divorce to the husband on the record. It seems that there could scarcely be
imagined a clearer case of recrimination, yet there was no allusion to that doctrine.
The development of recrimination in Missouri is an interesting example of
a judicial attempt to stretch the facts of particular cases so as to arrive at just
and equitable results without disturbing precedents which date from the opinions
of an old English ecclesiastical justice' who did not fully understand the nature

1. 283 S.W.2d 391 (Mo App. 1955).
2. Ibid, p. 395.
3. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 43 Mo. 547 (1869) ; 27 C.J.S. 623.
4. Lord Stowell in Forster v. Forster, 1 Hagg. Con. 144 (1790); Proctor v.
Proctor, 2 Hagg. Con. 292 (1819).
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of the Roman and ecclesiastical doctrine he was expounding. It must be admitted
that they are largely justified by archaic Missouri statutes' based on the same
misconceptions.
In an excellent and scholarly discussion of the history of the problem,6 J. G.
Beamer, speaking of this ancient canon law defense,7 said:'
"In Roman times ... the doctrine was never used to prevent a divorce
because divorce was a matter entirely within the discretion of the parties
concerned, and.., the principle was applied . . .only as an equitable
means of dividing up the common property .... Later, under the canon
law, recrimination was still used only as a means of allowing the wife
to continue in the enjoyment of the common property. It did not prevent absolute divorce because absolute divorce was unknown to the
canon law. The English ecclesiastical courts . . . were powerless even
to use the doctrine to prevent the wife from being turned out into the
streets, much less as a defense to absolute divorce which could be granted
only by Parliament. In the parliamentary cases . . . it was a discretionary rather than a peremptory bar, and one to be invoked only when
justified.... And in the early American cases the ecclesiastical law was
applied under wholly dissimilar circumstances, with the result that a
new and fundamentally different doctrine of recrimination came into
being."
Bbamer goes on to point out that the doctrine has three possible sociological
justifications:*
"The first is that it tends to hold the family together; the second, that
it serves as a check upon immorality; the third, that it protects the
property rights of the wife."
It seems that these justifications are largely refuted by the facts of the
typical divorce case. First, a family which is sociologically dead cannot be pre-

5. Mo. REv. STAT. (1949):
See. 452.010 enumerates the grounds for divorce and says: "...
the
.injuredparty. . . may obtain a divorce.. ..
Sec. 452.020. Cross-bill of defendant. "... if the court shall be satisfied
that the defendant is the injured party, it shall enter judgment divorcing the
defendant from the said plaintiff, as prayed in the answer."
These sections as originally enacted referred to "the innocent and injured party." In 1849 they were amended, omitting the word "innocent."
They have always been construed as unchanged by this omission. See Hoffman v. Hoffman, 43 Mo. 547, 549 (1869).
Sec. 452.090. "In all cases where the proceedings shall be ex parte, the
court shall, before it grants the divorce, require proof of the good conduct of
the petitioner, and be satisfied that he or she is an innocent and injured
party."
6. Beamer, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce Proceedinga,10 KAN.
CITY L. REV. 213 (1942).
7. Ibid. Recrimination, collusion, connivance and condonation were the four
classic canon law defenses. They are still recognized.
8. Id. at 243.
9. Id. at 249.
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served by court action. Second, by denying relief the court may actually encourage immorality. Third, statutes have given married women virtual equality
in property rights.
Recrimination in Missouri stems from the case of Ryan v. Ryan."0 There
the court discussed but did not answer the question as to whether a recriminatory
offense must be "in bar", that is, precisely the same or of equal gravity.
In Nagel v. Nagel" the court faced that issue squarely: 1"
"It cannot, with reference to the rights of the injured party, be said
that adultery is a more heinous offense, or one of greater moral turpitude, than others enumerated in the act, for the effect of each is the same,
as they severally entitle the party injured to a divorce."
The court held squarely that any statutory ground for divorce does constitute a recriminatory offense. These precedents were followed by all the early
Missouri Supreme Court decisions. 3 The last of the early opinions in Hoffman v.
Hoffman1 said:1"
"If both parties have a right to a divorce, neither party has."
This rule, literally interpreted, required blind obedience without consideration of the intolerable marital situations involved in many cases. For many
years this rule was apparently followed to the letter1 and our courts still give
it complete lip service. 11

10. 9 Mo. 539 (1845).
11. 12 Mo. 53 (1848).
12. Id. at 56.
13. See Doyle v. Doyle, 26 Mo. 545 (1858).
14. 43 Mo. 547 (1869).
15. Id. at 549.
16. Straley v. Straley, 221 Mo. App. 1136, 298 S.W. 110 (1927); Coons v.
Coons, 236 S.W. 358 (Mo. App. 1922); Ellebrecht v. Ellebrecht, 243 S.W. 209 (Mo.
App. 1922); Jones v. Jones, 208 Mo. App. 632, 235 S.W. 481 (1921); Harris v.
Harris, 223 S.W. 771 (Mo. App. 1920) ; Nolker v. Nolker, 208 S.W. 128 (Mo. App.
1919) ; Elder v. Elder, 186 S.W. 530 (Mo. App. 1916) ; Hogsett v. Hogsett, 186 S.W.
1171 (Mo. App. 1916); Shearer v. Shearer, 189 S.W. 592 (Mo. App. 1916);
Speiser v. Speiser, 188 Mo. App. 328, 175 S.W. 122 (1915) ; Bethel v. Bethel, 181
Mo. App. 601, 164 S.W. 682 (1914); Gruner v. Gruner, 183 Mo. App. 157, 165
S.W. 865 (1914) ; Collett v. Collett, 170 Mo. App. 590, 157 S.W. 90 (1913) ; Barth
v. Barth, 168 Mo. App. 423, 151 S.W. 769 (1912) ; Wallner v. Wallner, 167 Mo.
App. 677, 150 S.W. 1082 (1912) ; Libbe v. Libbe, 157 Mo. App. 701, 138 S.W. 685
(1911); Miles v. Miles, 137 Mo. App. 38, 119 S.W. 456 (1909); Wells v. Wells, 108
Mo. App. 88, 82 S.W. 1103 (1904); Coe v. Coe, 98 Mo. App. 472, 72 S.W. 707
(1903); Lawlor v. Lawlor, 76 Mo. App. 637 (1898); Morrison v. Morrison, 62 Mo.
App. 299 (1895).
17. Garton v. Garton, 246 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. App. 1952); Cody v. Cody, 233
S.W.2d 777 (Mo. App. 1950); Chapman v. Chapman, 230 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. App.
1950); Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 230 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. App. 1950); Thompson
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However, there is a growing tendency in decisions of the past forty years,
by ignoring or stretching the facts or by ignoring the doctrine itself, to evade
its harsh results.
One method quite commonly employed by the appellate courts is to hold that
the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that one spouse was not guilty of
serious marital misconduct when the contrary facts virtually scream from the
record.
The Supreme Court has spoken only once on the question in the past eightyseven years. The results in Andris v. Andris" were similar to the Eikermann
case." The husband sought a divorce on grounds of general indignities. The
trial court gave him a divorce. The St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed the
decree on the ground that the husband was not an innocent party and therefore
not entitled to a divorce.2 ' But the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the
trial court, surely a clear case of recrimination if responsible and qualified judges
can differ so completely on the interpretation of the evidence on the record. The
Supreme Court, apparently content to let sleeping dogs lie, did not mention
recrimination.
There are at least three recent cases from the intermediate courts of appeal
which abandon all pretense of applying recriminaition and espouse the doctrine
of comparative rectitude, the balancing of the equities which is so familiar in
other equitable actions.
Kolaks v. Kolaks" affirmed a divorce awarded to the wife. The facts were
that she would often fly into a rage, hit her husband with dishes, that she
threatened him with a butcher knife, a pistol and a rifle, told the children not to
mind him, and threatened to kill him while asleep. One of the children testified
that it was "six of one and half a dozen of the other," that the father was as
much to blame as the mother. The trial court said in the record:"
"It is difficult for a court to decide the issues in this case, as it is hard
to determine from the evidence who is the guilty party and who is the
innocent and injured party. If I did not feel that because of the public
being an interested party [sic], I would not grant either party a divorce."

v. Thompson, 84 S.W.2d 990 (Mo. App. 1935); Miles v. Miles, 54 S.W.2d 741, (Mo.
App. 1932); Lawson v. Lawson, 44 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. App. 1931); Cherry v.
Cherry, 225 Mo. App. 998, 35 S.W.2d 659 (1931); Tebbe v. Tebbe, 223 Mo. App.
1106, 21 S.W.2d 915 (1929) ; Schumacher v. Schumacher, 14 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. App.
1929).
18. 343 Mo. 1162, 125 S.W.2d 38 (1938).
19. Eikermann v. Eikermann, supra note 1.
20. Andris v. Andris, 234 Mo. App. 48, 109 S.W.2d 707 (1937).
21. 75 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. App. 1934).
22. Id. at 603.
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Thus prima facie admitting the existence of recrimination, the trial judge
proceeded' o give the wife a divorce. The appellate court sustained the decree,
23
saying:
".... that whatever wrongful conduct defendant may have indulged
in against plaintiff, was due to plaintiff's harsh and cruel treatment of
defendant throughout the years of their married life."
The court here seems to be advancing a theory of provocation. Of course,
if the innocent spouse's misdeeds are reasonably provoked by his mate's misconduct, then his conduct is legally justified and cannot be used as a recriminatory
defense." The vast majority of recriminatory suits involve mutual indignities.
In any such case it is a simple matter for the court to hold that the actions of
the spouse with whom it sympathizes were provoked by the guilty party, thus
effecting a judicial repeal of recrimination.
Pickett v. Piclcett"
was a case of mutual indignities in which a decree for
the the husband was sustained in these words:"

"No thoughtful person can read this record without being convinced
that this elderly couple, probably ill mated and ill matched in the beginning, have quarreled and each resented the conduct and conversation
of the other for so long a time that it is now utterly impossible for them
to live together as man and wife, or have the slightest degree of respect
for each other. The defendant has stated that she will not live with
plaintiff. Under such circumstances society is not benefited by the court
requiring of them the impossible [emphasis added]. Of course, the
decree cannot stand unless the plaintiff is the innocent and injured
jparty. No good purpose would be served by attempting to point out in
detail all of the conflicts in the evidence. We have set out the salient
facts, and sufficient to say we conclude they show a preponderance of the
evidence in favor of plaintiff [emphasis added], and especially in view
of the deference to the trial court's findings to which they are entitled,
the testimony as a whole justified the decree as rendered."
The inconsistencies on the face of this excerpt speak for themselves. The
court's logic has become hopelessly ensnarled in its quest for a happy ending.
Politte v. Politte7 was a case of mutual indignities. The facts were a sordid
story of arguments, vile language, fights, beatings and police court. The record
established virtually beyond question that the husband had used physical violence
on more than one occasion. Yet the court sustained a decree for him, saying:"3
". .. plaintiff has, by a preponderance of the evidence [emphasis
added], established facts which prove that he was the injured party and

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Ibid.
Garton v. Garton, 246 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. App. 1952).
150 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. App. 1941).
Id. at 590.
230 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. App. 1950).
Id. at 148.
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that he has not been guilty of such indignities as would preclude a
decree in his favor."
It is quite obvious even to the casual observer that in a very large proportion
8
2
of modern divorce cases, neither spouse is actually innocent. ' It has been said: "
"... as matters stand a fair case may be made out that the innocent
spouse is rapidly becoming a myth."
A judicial separation is no solution to this problem in Missouri. The wife,
in a proceeding for separate maintenance, cannot prevail unless she proves facts
which would entitle her to a divorce if that were the relief she was seeking.'
Scheer v. Scheer" indicated four factors severely limiting the application
of recrimination, factors which may be applied in virtually any case to reach
the desired result. First, the plaintiff's conduct need not be letter-perfect and
above reproach to entitle him to a divorce. Second, plaintiff's occasional outbursts are excused if they are provoked by defendant's wrongful conduct. Third,
recriminatory conduct must be such as to entitle defendant prima facie to a
divorce. Fourth, plaintiff must be guilty of a continuous course of conduct connoting settled hate and a manifestation of alienation and estrangement; proof
of mere occasional acts or words will not suffice to constitute indignities.
There are at least four other comparable modern cases to this same general
effect," or a total of ten cases cited herein. Thus it seems that although the
doctrine of recrimination still stands on our books and still receives lip service,
it is presently subject to considerable judicial erosion.
Such a development is long overdue and is much to be encouraged, particularly
in the absence of remedial legislation. Recrimination is an anachronism dating
from an era when the courts lacked the social consciousness and realistic approach
to human problems which we hope they employ today. The threat of alleging
recrimination can be used as a means of coercion by an unscrupulous spouse,
thereby precluding an impartial consideration of the equities involved. As Beamer
eloquently phrases it:"
"It is in the case in which only one of the parties is willing to make a
sacrifice to obtain his freedom that this undercover, immoral situation
is inadequate, and the refusal of the courts and legislatures to take a

29. Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 TULANE L. Rnv. 377 (1937).
30. Id. at 384.
31. Brady v. Brady, 71 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1934).
32. 238 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. App. 1951).
33. McCormack v. McCormack, 238 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. App. 1951); Rankin v.
Rankin, 17 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. App. 1929) ; Wehrenbrecht v. Wehrenbrecht, 200 Mo.
App. 452, 207 S.W. 290 (1918) ; Willett v. Willett, 196 S.W. 1058 (Mo. App. 1917).
34. Beamer, op. cit., supra note 6, p. 214.
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realistic view of the situation works a hardship on the party who has the
greater respect for the law and wishes to live within its confines."
Beamer continues: "
"... . the doctrine of recrimination, as outlined by the appellate courts,
does not obtain in actual practice. It is common knowledge that most
divorce suits are not contested, and that in the few which are, recrimination is seldom mentioned. The result is that our divorce courts operate upon unsound foundations, contempt for the law and for the courts is bred in
the minds of the people, the parties themselves are forced to conceal matters which should be decided by an impartial tribunal, and a petty form of
blackmail is encouraged."
The reason most often advanced to sustain the doctrine is the clean hands
maxim of equity." Yet, in England, the jurisdiction to which we trace the trouble,
the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 gave the trial judge discretion to grant a
divorce in such cases. It has been liberally interpreted and has found favor
with both the bar and the laity. 7
Though any complete survey of the matter is beyond the scope of this note, it
seems that at least eighteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted the
mitigating influence of the doctrine of comparative fault to some extent by statute or by the process of "judicial legislation."'"
An excellent discussion of the considerations involved may be found in the
opinion of Traynor, J. in a recent California case." He stated that the court'"
". .. is clothed with a broad discretion to advance the requirements
of justice in each particular case."
He enunciated four major considerations to guide this exercise of judicial
discretion:'" 1. The prospect of reconciliation; 2. The effect of the marital conflict upon the parties; 3. The effect of the marital conflict upon third parties;
4. Comparative guilt.
This precedent was followed in a later case' 2 where the court upheld a decree
granting divorces to both parties. The court said:'
"The trial court was justified in concluding that the legitimate objects
of the marriage had been destroyed, that its continuation was seriously

35. Id. at 252.
36. "The 'Reasons' for the Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce," 26 COL. L.
Rnv. 83 (1926).
37. Id. at 86.
38. See 170 A.L.R. 1076 (1947); 159 A.L.R. 734 (1945); 152 A.L.R. 336
(1944); and 27 C.J.S. 624. These states are Ark., Cal., Ida., Ia., Kans., Ky., La.,
Mich., Minn., Neb., N. Mex., Okla., Ore., Pa., Tex., Utah, Wash., and Wyo.
39. DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
40. Id. at 606.
41. Ibid.
42. Mueller v. Mueller, 282 P.2d 869 (Cal. 1955).
I
43. Id. at 870.
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impairing plaintiff's health and threatening defendant's health, and that
it involved an atmosphere of bitterness and hatred in the home that was
clearly deleterious to the interests of the children."
Although statistics are obviously not available, it is a matter of common
knowledge to practising attorneys and trial judges throughout our state that a
very large proportion of the divorces granted in Missouri today would be denied
if recrimination were enforced. It constitutes perhaps the most hypocritical area
of our law. The recent judicial tendency to avoid it is highly desirable from the
standpoint of justice to the individual parties and overall benefit to society. In
the absence of remedial legislation it is the wisest and most realistic solution to
a vexing problem.
FRED H. MAUGnMER, JR.

PROPERTY-FIXTURES--GAS TANK ON CONCRETE BLOCKS
Bastus . McCurdy'
A contract for the sale of a farm was entered into between the plaintiffs as
buyers and the defendants as sellers. A modern house was situated on the farm.
It was equipped with a hot-water heater, space heater, refrigerator, and cook
stove, all of which operated on Butane gas. The gas was stored in a 500 pound
tank, located some distance from the house and resting upon concrete blocks
placed on top of the ground. The tank was held in place by its own weight and
was not otherwise affixed to the realty. The gas was transmitted from the tank to
the various appliances in the house through an underground copper tube that
entered the basement and then branched out up through the floor of the house
to the appliances.
At the time of the sale of the property, the defendants represented the house
to the plaintiffs as a modern house with gas heat and gas hot-water heater. Upon
vacating the premises after consummation of the sale, the defendants removed
from the premises the gas tank, space heater, and hot-water heater. The plaintiffs
brought an action for damages for the removal of the tank and water-heater, the
space heater having been returned by the defendants. The jury in the trial court
returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed from a judgment
entered thereon.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals sustained the defendants' appeal and reversed the judgment for the plaintiff below, stating that there was no instruction
given by the trial court requiring the jury to find that the defendant intended

1. 266 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. App. 1954).
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that the gas tank and hot-water heater become a part of the realty at the time
they were installed by the defendants. Because of this error the case was remanded
for a new trial. This case has not come up to the appellate level again and no
other determination has been made in Missouri as to whether such gas tanks as
were involved are realty or personalty.
Gas tanks of the type involved in the Bastus case are a relatively new technological advancement in the field of suburban and rural living. Tanks of the size
involved in the Bastus case are generally used in conjunction with several gas
operated appliances or with a gas central heating unit. If the gas tank in the
Bastus case had been small in size and capacity, and used merely to supply a
cooking stove or a refrigerator which was taken when the vendor vacated the
premises, it clearly would have been personalty and subject to removal by the
vendor upon his vacating the premises after sale. However, in the Bastus case
the tank was large in size and capacity and supplied gas for the heating unit of
the house as well as for the other gas appliances which were to be left with the
house.
There have been only two cases decided in the United States at this time which
involve the property status of gas tanks of the type involved in the Bastus case.
These cases involve different factual situations and circumstances than those involved in the Bastus case and, therefore, cannot be relied upon as authority for
determining whether the gas tanks are realty or personalty.'
It is generally held that whether a particular thing is a fixture and a part of
the realty or a mere chattel is a mixed question of law and fact, and a question
for the jury to decide from all the evidence.' The criteria applied in Missouri, as

2. Holicer Gas Company, Inc. v. Wilson, 45 So.2d 96 (La. App. 1950);
Edwards v. S. & R. Gas Co., 73 So.2d 590 (La. App. 1954). In both cases gas
dealers had placed gas tanks of the type involved in the Bastus case on land
under a lease arrangement with the owner of the premises, who agreed to pay the
gas dealer a certain annual rental for the gas tank and to purchase his gas from
the gas dealer. In each case the land owner sold the land to a third party who
claimed title to the gas tanks as being a part of the realty and passing with the
conveyance to him. Each case arose when the gas dealer brought an action to
recover the gas tank or the value thereof.
In the Holicer decision, it was held that the gas dealer could not remove the
gas tank or recover the value thereof because it had become a part of the realty
and passed with the land to the purchaser as a part of the realty. In the Edwards
case, the same court overruled its earlier decision and held that the gas dealer
could enter and remove the gas tank because the owner of the land had not paid
for or acquired title to the tank and could not pass title of the tank to the purchaser of the land even though it could be considered under Louisiana law an
"immovable." It was stated that before the chattel could become a part of the
realty, there had to be unity of title in that the title to the chattel and
to the realty had to be in one and the same person at the time of the annexation
of the chattel to the realty. Since the owner of the land did not have title to the
gas tank, the gas tank could not become a part of the realty.
3. Grand Lodge of Masons v. Knox, 27 Mo. 315 (1858); Elliott v. Black, 45
Mo. 372 (1870). See also Goodin v. Elleardsville Hall Ass'n., 5 Mo. App. 289
(1878)by;University
O'Brian of
v.Missouri
Hanson,School
9 Mo.of App.
545 (1881).
Published
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Repository, 1956
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elsewhere, in determining whether a chattel has become a fixture are annexation,
adaption, and the intention of the person annexing at the time of the annexation,
with intention being the most important element.'
Annexation refers to the physical attachment of the thing to the land and
can be either actual or constructive.' The general rule is that, absent any agreement between the parties, all fixtures whether actually or constructively annexed
to the realty, pass with the conveyance of the realty.'
Adaption refers to the fixture being regularly used in the use and occupancy
of the realty to which it is actually or constructively annexed. In Smyth Sales
Corporationv. Norfolk Building and Loan Assn.,' it was held that an oil burning
heating unit consisting of burner, fuel pump and a fuel tank located outside the
house, was so adapted to the premises that it had become a part of the'realty and
could not be removed therefrom. Other cases have held that oil heating systems
consisting of oil burners located inside the building and fuel tanks located outside
the building were so adapted to the premises as to constitute a part thereof.'
The last and most important element of a fixture is the intention of the
person annexing the article to the realty at the time of the annexation.' In the

4. Matz v. Miami Club Restaurant, 127 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. App. 1939).
5. Moller-Vandenboom Lumber Co. v. Boudreau, 231 Mo. App. 1127, 85 S.W.2d
141 (1935) (stating that immovability of the object is not the sole test of whether
it has become a fixture.); Banner Iron Works v. Aetna Iron Works, 143 Mo. App.
1, 122 S.W. 762 (1909) (stating that whether in a particular instance the article
became part of the realty and a fixture is not determined altogether, or even principally, by the mode in which it is attached to the building or land, and whether
the attachment is slight or strong, or whether the article can be removed readily
without damage to the freehold); United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Cann, 276 P.2d 858
(Calif. App. 1954) (holding that portions of equipment not attached to the land
but which are used with and essential to the other portions attached to the land
constitute a unit and are constructively annexed); Hunt v. Mullanphy, 1 Mo. 361,
14 Am. Dec. 30 (1825).
6. Slater v. Dowd, 53 S.E.2d 598 (Ga. App. 1949).
7. 184 Atl. 204 (N.J. Apps. 1939); See also Atlantic Die Casting Co. v.
Whiting Tubular Products, Inc., 337 Mich. 414, 60 N.W.2d 174 (1953) (holding
as the rule that whatever is affixed to a building by an owner to facilitate its use
and occupation in general becomes a part of the realty. The court held that certain
gas heating equipment was necessary to the purpose to which the realty was
adapted and it became a fixture upon its annexation to the property. The court
also held that when the purchaser accepted the building, he had every reason
to believe that the gas heating equipment was a fixture to the building).
8. Gar Wood Industries, Inc. v. Colonial Homes, Inc., 305 Mass. 41, 24 N.E.2d
767 (1940). See also Nicklas v. Pickford, 289 N.Y. Supp. 174, 160 Misc. 254 (Sup.
Ct. 1936); Kain v. Coble, 132 N.J.L. 315, 40 .A.2d 350 (1945), affirmed 133
N.J.L. 314, 44 A.2d 212 (1945). .
9. Banner Iron Works v. Aetna Iron Works, supra note 2 (Stating that the
principal criterion is the intention with which the owner of the land or building
put the material into the building or on the land-whether his purpose was to make
it permanently a part of the land or tenement. If he had this purpose when he
made the annexation, then, though it is fastened to the freehold only slightly, and
may be displaced without injury to the freehold, it usually will be treated as a
fixture.).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss3/5

16

et al.: Recent Cases
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW[o

[Vol. 21

Bastus case the question as to the annexor's intent at the time he annexed the gas
tank to the realty was held to be a jury question and the plaintiff's case failed
because there was no instruction which required the jury to find the annexor's
intention. 0 Early Missouri cases 1 have held that the party making the annexation must intend to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold and that
this intention can be inferred from the nature of the article affixed, the relation
and situation of the party making the annexation, such as vendor-vendee,
mortgagor-mortgagee, or landlord-tenant, and the policy of law applicable
thereto, the structure and mode of the annexation and the purpose and use for
which the annexation has been made. Other tests for the determination of the
annexor's intent have been adopted by other courts."
The intention of the party annexing does not have to be that the annexation
shall be perpetual, but rather that the intention shall be that the article is to be
annexed until worn out, until the purpose to which the land is devoted has been
accomplished, or until the article is superseded by another article more suitable for
the purpose."8
It must be remembered, however, that even though intention is the most important element the existence of intention alone without the presence and existence
of the other elements is not enough to transform a mere chattel into a fixture."

10. Note 1, supra, pages 51, 52: "In determining the intention of the person
making the annexation, the court or jury is not bound by his testimony on the
point, nor by his secret or undisclosed purpose, but may decide the issue from his
acts and conduct and the surrounding facts and circumstances." It was also
stated that there need not be any direct testimony on the question of intent as
the jury may make its own findings on this issue from a consideration of the facts
and circumstances in evidence.
11. The State Savings Bank v. Kercheval, 65 Mo. 682 (1877) (The court stated
that on the grounds of public policy, many things are regarded as chattels in
controversies between landlords and tenants which would unquestionably be held
as fixtures as between vendor-vendee or mortgagor-mortgagee.); Thomas v.
Davis, 76 Mo. 72 (1882). See also M. P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, 8 Cal.2d 31, 63
P.2d 818 (1937); Citizens Bank of Greenfield v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 216
Ind. 573, 25 N.E.2d 444 (1940). In Warrington v. Hignutt, 3 Terry 274, 31 A.2d
480 (Del. Super. 1943). The court stated that the relationship of the annexor
to the land at the time of the annexation must be considered in determining the
annexor's intent, when the article annexed to the land can be removed and utilized
as well elsewhere.
12. Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Treadwell, 217 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1954) (intention which a normal owner of realty would have in bringing the chattel upon the
property); M. P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson and Citizens Bank of Greenfield v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., supra note 11, where courts stated that the test is that it
must appear from the nature of the article that if it is used for the purpose for
which it was designed, it would naturally and necessarily be annexed to and become
a permanent and integral part of the realty.
13. Pritchard Petroleum Co. v. Farmers Co-Op Oil and Supply Co. of Conrad,
117 Mont. 467, 161 P.2d 526 (1945).
14. Loan v. Gregg, 55 Mo. App. 581 (1874).
Pennsylvania and some other states have adopted a rule pertaining only to
articles used in trade or manufacture and which is very different from the Mis-
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A Missouri court"s at a very early date decided that annexation by a fee-simple
owner gives rise to a strong presumption that the intention in making the improvements was to make them permanent.

souri rule as to articles used for private purposes. This rule simply stated is that
whether fast or loose, all the machinery of a manufactory which is necessary to
constitute it, and without which it would not be a manufactory at all, must pass
for a part of the freehold. Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 Watts & S. 116, 37 Am. Dec.
490 (1841); Appeal of Defense Plant Corp., 350 Pa. 520, 39 A.2d 713 (1944);
affirmed R.F.C. v. Beavers County, Pa., 328 U.S. 204 (1945); In re Taylor and
Dean Manufacturing Co., 136 F.2d 370 (3rd Cir. 1943).
These cases hold that all chattels placed in an industrial establishment for
permanent use and necessary to the operation of the plant, become fixtures and
hence a part of the real estate, regardless of whether or not they are physically
attached thereto. They regard all machinery necessary for the operation of the
factory and to make it a going concern as a part of the freehold.
Missouri in Hunt v. Mullanphy, supra note 5, in 1825 took the position that
all articles annexed to land for trade or manufacture were of a personal character,
if they could be removed without violence to the land. This view was based on
public' policy to encourage trade and manufacture. However, in 1909, in Banner
Iron Works v. Aetna Iron Works, supra note 5, the court stated that in the case of
machinery, the adaptability of the article to the work or business of the place has
to be considered. If the thing furnished was necessary to that work or business or
necessary to the purpose for which the building was designed and used, or was a
convenient accessory, or commonly employed in connection with such business, then
the intention of the proprietor of the business to annex the article permanently
to the realty could be inferred.
In U.S. v. Becktold Co., 129 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1942), the Federal District
Court stated that it is well established by controlling Missouri decisions that
where machinery is placed in a building and the land, building and machinery are
used together as a factory or plant, the machinery is a part of the realty.
In Green v. Shamrod, 185 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App. 1945), the defendant contended that the same rule the court had stated in the Becktold case was the Missouri law. The court rejected the contention and stated that the Missouri rule is
that where a building is erected for, or permanently adapted, or devoted to, a
particular purpose, anything annexed to the building for the carrying out of
that purpose may be considered as accessory to the realty itself, while such
articles annexed merely for the purpose for which the building happens at the
time to be used are not to be so regarded. The court held that the building involved might well, or better, be used for other commercial purposes, and that
the equipment involved was merely installed for use in the business for which the
building happened at the time to be used.
In Stockton v. Tester, 273 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. App. 1954), the court stated that
articles annexed to the realty by a tenant for the sole purpose of enabling the
tenant to carry on his business are trade fixtures and are removable by the tenant.
Even though a fixture is particularly adapted to a particular type of building,
this does not in itself make it irremovable. It is only where the article is so placed
as to make the building itself peculiarly adapted and more usable for the type of
business that the article is not removable.
It would seem from these decisions that Missouri has not adopted as strict a
view toward trade fixtures as Pennsylvania. Missouri holds that trade fixtures
will only be considered a part of the realty when the building itself is usable for
only one particular purpose, and the articles annexed aid in that purpose, or
where the articles annexed change the character of the building so that it can
only be used for one purpose and no other. Articles annexed to further the purpose to which a building is temporarily put would not be a part of the realty.
15. Tyler v. White, 68 Mo. App. 607 (1897).
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The gas tank in the Bastus case meets all the elements of a fixture. It was
constructively although not actually annexed to the land. It was adapted to the
use made of the land as it furnished the gas supply for the several gas appliances
which passed with the realty to the purchasers. From all the tests as to the intention of the annexor, which have been enumerated above, it seems that the
sellers' intent, when they placed the gas tank on the land, was to make the gas
tank a permanent part of the realty. Had not the instruction requiring that the
jury find the intention of the annexor been omitted below, it seems certain that
the Court of Appeals would have affirmed the trial court's decision, which held the
gas tank a part of the realty.
RICHARD DAHMS

TORTS--HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE-COUNTERCLAIM BASED
ON PLAINTIFF'S PRIMARY NEGLIGENCE
Seiler v. W. H. Powell Lumber Company'
This was an action for personal injuries sustained when an automobile owned
and driven by plaintiff collided with a truck owned by defendant. The collision
occurred in the westbound lane of a two-lane state highway in St. Louis Cpunty.
Plaintiff's car was traveling east and the defendant lumber company truck was
west-bound. Plaintiff contended that she had pulled sharply to the left and into
the west bound lane immediately prior to the collision because the defendant's
truck was approaching in her lane. Plaintiff also testified that a gravel truck coming from behind her pulled up beside her on her right and prevented her from
turning to the right to avoid the collision. The defendant's evidence, supported by
several eyewitnesses, was to the effect that defendant's driver was never out of
his proper lane and that the accident occurred by reason of plaintiff's attempt to
pass this same gravel truck when the defendant's truck was so close that a collision could not be avoided. Plaintiff submitted her cause of action to the jury
solely on the humanitarian doctrine, and the defendant submitted its counterclaim
for damage to the truck on two theories of primary negligence, that of plaintiff's
excessive speed and plaintiff negligently passing when the way ahead was not
clear of approaching traffic. The jury found in favor of the defendant both
on the petition and counterclaim and awarded the defendant one thousand dollars
damages, from which plaintiff appealed. The St. Louis Court of Appeals held that
where plaintiff submitted her case under the humanitarian rule, the trial court's
instruction which submitted the defendant's counterclaim on plaintiff's primary
negligence to the jury, and did not refer to plaintiff's humanitarian case, did not
submit issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury and was proper.

1. 283 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. App. 1955).
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The well known doctrine of last clear chance is based on the social policy of
not denying recovery to the negligent plaintiff if the negligent defendant is the
last responsible actor in having an opportunity to avoid the accident after plaintiff is in a position of imminent peril Under the Missouri humanitarian doctrine,
as under the last clear chance doctrine generally, instructions which raise the
issue of contributory negligence are erroneous, since the social policy on which
the doctrine is founded demands that when a humanitarian case is submitted,
contributory negligence becomes a foreign issue.2 Though there has been some
conilict,' it is now established that the proper defenses to a humanitarian case.
are either a refutation of one or more of the necessary elements of the humanitarian case, or a showing that the plaintiff's injury was the sole cause of his
injury.'
It being agreed that contributory negligence has no place in a case submitted
solely on the humanitarian doctrine, the question in this case is whether the defendant's counterclaim based on plaintiff's primary negligence injects contributory negligence into the case? General language in a number of Missouri cases
would seem to indicate that it is improper to present the primary negligence of
the plaintiff to the jury in any form.' But such statements are dicta in cases
where no counterclaim on plaintiff's primary negligence is in issue. The two
Missouri cases which deal directly with the problem here considered are in
irreconcilable conflict.

2. In early American cases involving last clear chance situations, courts
insisted on explaining the doctrine in terms of fault, and thus spun the web of
proximate cause which has entangled decisions down to the present day. The
better approach would seem to be to consider "last clear chance" an exception to
the rule of contributory negligence, based on the proposition that the last responsible actor should be held liable for the injury. Unfortunately, Missouri
courts have not clearly indicated on which theory our humanitarian doctrine
rests. McCleary, The Basis of the Humanitarian Doctrine Reexamined, 5 Mo.
L. R v. 56 (1940); PR0ssEn, ToRTs § 52 (2d ed. 1955).
, 3. McCall v. Thompson, 348 Mo. 795, 155 S.W.2d 161 (1941); Byrnes v.
Poplar Bluff Printing Co., 74 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1934); Wolfson v. Cohen, 55 S.W.2d
677 (Mo. 1933) ; Silliman v. Munger Laundry, 329 Mo. 235, 44 S.W.2d 159 (1931) ;
McElwee v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 70 Fed. Supp. 97 (D.C. Mo. 1947); Johnston v.
Brewer, 40 Cal.App.2d 583, 105 P.2d 365 (1940); Donald v. Heller, 143 Neb. 600,
10 N.W.2d 447 (1943).
4. Millhouser v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 331 Mo. 933, 55 S.W.2d
673 (1932).
5. McGrath v. Meyers, 341 Mo. 412, 107 S.W.2d 792 (1937); Doherty v. St.
Louis Butter Co., 339 Mo. 996, 98 S.W.2d 742 (1936); Borgstede v. Waldbauer,
337 Mo. 1205, 88 S.W.2d 373 (1935) ; Cooper v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,
233 Mo. App. 229, 116 S.W.2d 212 (1938).
6. Bucks v. Hamill, 358 Mo. 617, 216 S.W.2d 423 (1948); Zickefoose v.
Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 148 S.W.2d 784 (1941) ; Robinson v. Kansas City Public
Service Co., 345 Mo. 764, 137 S.W.2d 548 (1939) ; Lynch v. Baldwin, 117 S.W.2d
273 (Mo. 1938); Ritz v. Cousins Lumber Co., 227 Mo. App. 1167, 59 S.W.2d
1072 (1933); Gray v. Terminals Co., 331 Mo. 73, 52 S.W.2d 809 (1932).
7. Hangge v. Umbright, 119 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1938); State ex Tel. Grisham
v. Allen, 344 Mo. 66, 124 S.W.2d 1080 (1939); discussed briefly by Mr. Becker
in 4 Mo. L. REv. at 409 (1939).
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The court in the principal case quotes at length from the opinion in Hangge
v. Umbright' and seems to follow the reasoning of that case. In both cases the
court noted the extreme care with which the instructions were framed, so as to
avoid any mention of contributory negligence or of the plaintiff's humanitarian
case. The case of State ex rel. Grisham v. Allen,0 holding that a counterclaim
based on plaintiff's primary negligence is improper because it allows the jury
to consider an issue of contributory negligence, seems unduly restrictive. As is
pointed out in the principal case, to follow the doctrine of State ex rel Grisham
v. Aflen" to its logical extreme would be to deny the defendant the right to
counterclaim in a case where the plaintiff relies on the humanitarian doctrine.
It has been observed that the Missouri courts have already converted the
"last clear chance" doctrine into a "no chance" doctrine so far as defendants
are concerned," and it is exceedingly questionable that the defendant should be
further confined. It seems that we shall make progress toward a workable policy
in this area only through decisions such as the one in the principal case. To deny
the propriety of the defendant's counterclaim here would be to further restrict
an already harrassed defendant and to encourage a "race to the courthouse" type
of law in automobile collision cases.
G. ANDY RUNGE

TORTS-NUISANCE-MAINTENANCE OF POND TO ATTRACT
MIGRATORY BIRDS
Andrews v. Andrews"
Plaintiff owned and occupied land contiguous to that of the defendant. The
plaintiff's only source of income was from farming and cultivating his premises
which he has continued to do since 1945, the time of his purchasing the land. Prior
to 1949 the crops of the plaintiff were never bothered but in that year the defendant
constructed upon his land an artificial pond located approximately 400 feet from
that of the plaintiff. During 1951-'52, the defendant placed lame wild geese, food
and bait on the pond to attract the wild geese as they flew south from Canada.
Immediately thereafter large numbers of geese came to the pond and used it as
a base from which they set upon the land of the plaintiff and destroyed his crops
and fields. The first winter, there were 200 geese, the second 1200 geese, and the

8. Hangge v. Umbright, supra note 7.
9. State ex rel. Grisham v. Allen, supra note 7.
10. Ibid.
11. See Ch. J. Ellison's dissent in Perkins v. Terminal R.R. Assoc., 340 Mo.
868, 102 S.W.2d 915 (1937); also 119 A.L.R. 1085 (1939).
1. 242 N.C. 382, 88 S.E.2d 88 (1955).
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third 3000 geese. The amount of crops devoured were in the amounts of $48,
$105, and $1343 respectively. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant knew of
the nature of wild geese to seek food from neighboring lands and, after repeated
requests by the plaintiff that the defendant stop baiting the pond and informing
him of the results, the defendant continued to bait the pond. It was proved that
geese multiply in a geometric progression and that accordingly 7,500 geese will
arrive this year and 20,000 the next year. The plaintiff sought to have the defendant enjoined from maintaining a nuisance and to answer in damages for the
loss the plaintiff has sustained. The defendant demurred to the petition and from
a judgment sustaining the demurrer the plaintiff appealed. On appeal the Supreme
Court of North Carolina reversed the lower court and stated the plaintiff had a
cause of action.
The defendant contended that there was no cause of action because the geese
are wild and therefore he does not own them and further that he had not been
negligent in the construction or maintenance of his pond. The supreme court in
reversing the lower court did so upon the basis of tort liability designated as
2
private nuisance per accidens, or, in fact, and that negligence did not have to be
alleged as it was not essential in order that an act constitute a nuisance.4
Justice Parker, in a dissenting opinion, cited Sickman V. U.S." in which
there were similar facts, the case containing dictum to the effect that.the Federal
government would not be liable in damages for the trespass of migratory birds
because they are animals ferae naturae; therefore the United States had no
ownership in such birds.
The plaintiff in the present case relied upon an ancient maxim, sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas, meaning so to use your own as not to injure another's
property. This maxim lies at the foundation of the law of nuisance and accordingly, while everyone has the right to use his property as he sees fit, this right
is subject to the implied obligation of every owner or occupant of property to use
it in such a way that it will not unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of

2. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953). A
private nuisance per accidens, or, in fact, becomes a nuisance by reason of its
location or the manner in which it is constructed, or maintained, or operated;
see also 39 Am. JUn. § 11, p. 290 and annotations in 35 A.L.R. 95 (1925) and 51
A.L.R. 1215 (1927).
3. Swinson v. Cutter Realty Co., 200 N.C. 276, 156 S.E. 545 (1931), in which
it states that while the same act or ownership may constitute negligence and at
the same time become a nuisance per accidens, and be practically inseparable,
yet the latter may be created, or maintained, or operated without negligence.
See also Bollinger v. Mungle, 175 S.W.2d 912 (Mo. App. 1943).
4. 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950), a case in which the plaintiff owns land
located along the westerly side of Horseshoe Lake State Game Preserve in Illinois.
The action for damages as a result of crops being destroyed by the geese was
brought under the Federal Torts Claims Act which permits suit against the
government for the negligence of a federal employee. However, the suit was dismissed because there was no negligence on the part of a federal employee.
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other property owners in the use of their property.' The defendant contended
that it was lawful for him to construct an artificial pond on his land because it
was a lawful use of his land, but the courts have held repeatedly that even though
an act or a structure was lawful when made or erected, if for any reason it later
becomes or causes a nuisance, the legitimate character of its origin does not justify its continuance as a nuisance.'
Due to the lack of any case exactly on the facts it is necessary to look at
analogous situations. In Holden v. Lewis," the defendant kept a hive of bees which
repeatedly crossed to the adjoining property owned by the plaintiff and stung,
menaced, and harassed the plaintiff so as to inconvenience and deprive them of the
reasonable enjoyment of their property. The court held that the keeping of bees
was not a nuisance per se but that the keeping of an unreasonable number in an
unreasonable place may be.8 The court further said:' "The difference between a
business which, no matter how it is conducted, is a nuisance per se as to certain
location and surrounding, and a business which is being so conducted as to become
a nuisance, lies in the proof, not in the remedy. In the former, the right to relief
is established by averment and proof of the mere act, in the other, proof of the
act and its consequences is necessary."
Certainly the keeping of geese on one's land is not a nuisance per se, but it
cannot be denied that the plaintiff has established an unreasonable injury to his
property on the alleged facts.
An important factor that has influenced the courts, in deciding that an act
constitutes a nuisance per accidens, has been prior knowledge on the part of the
defendant of the propensity of certain acts to result in harm or unreasonable
0
annoyance. Two cases in Missouri" emphasize the fact that damages were allowed
on the basis of nuisance where a dog bit a person after the defendant had knowledge of the vicious propensity of the dog. Both cases emphasized the keeping of
the dog after knowledge of the vicious propensity constituted a nuisance. In the
present case, it is alleged that the defendant knew of the propensity of wild
geese to feed on neighboring land and, after the plaintiff had told the defendant
of the destruction each year, he had knowledge. Therefore, it seems to follow

5. 66 C.J.S. § 8, p. 740.
6. Waidlick v. City of Manhatten, 150 Kan. 34, 90 P.2d 1104 (1939); 66
C.J.S. § 9, p. 747; further what constitutes a nuisance is thoroughly defined in
Taylor v. Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E.2d 724 (1944); see also 155 A.L.R.
54 (1945).
7. 33 Del. Co. 458 (Pa. 1945).
8. Case cites Arkadelphia v. Clark, 52 Ark. 23 (1889).
9. Supra n. 7 at 460.
10. Speckman v. Kreig, 79 Mo. App. 376 (1899), a case in which th 9 plaintiff was bitten by the dog while delivering chickens at the barn of the defendant's
in accordance with the defendant's directions; Patterson v. Rosenwald, 222 Mo.
App. 973, 6 S.W.2d 664 (1928).
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that the continuance of baiting the pond and attracting geese constituted a
nuisance.
Another Missouri case, Rhodes v. A. Moll Grocer Co.," involving the maintenance of a parking lot which the court determined to be a nuisance, the court
said that the plaintiff's allegations of noxious fumes and gases, dirt, and unreasonable noise as a result of the automobiles using the lot stated a cause of
action. Evidence was introduced showing that as many as sixty-two automobiles
used the lot at one time and that the sidewalks were made hazardous thereby by
such traffic entering and leaving the lot. This clearly sets forth the view that
the use of one's land in a seemingly lawful manner may become an unlawful
use."
Also the defendant in the present case contended that he had no control or
possession of these geese, that they were animals ferae naturae, and as such he
could not be liable for their trespasses. This is an untenable position which is
exemplified in the cases of Tushbant v. Greenfield's Inc." and Jacques V. National
Exhibit Co." In the former a restaurant owner was sued on the basis of maintaining a nuisance in as much as his customers during rush hours lined up in
front of the restaurant and thereby blocked the ingress and egress of an adjoining building. The court held this to constitute a nuisance. In the latter case the
defendant company operated a puppet show in their display window which
attracted large numbers resulting in the doorway of an adjoining business being
obstructed. This constituted a nuisance.

11. 231 Mo. App. 751, 95 S.W.2d 837 (1936).
12. Id. at 841, the court said: "We recognize the doctrine that the owner of
property has the right to exercise exclusive dominion over it and to devote it to
such lawful uses as will best subserve his private and personal interests and purposes, so long as he does not unduly and unlawfully infringe on the corresponding and equal legal rights of his neighbor in the enjoyment and use of his property in the lawful, usual, customary and reasonable manner, to which such
property is adaptable." Further: "When an owner of property puts his property
to such use as to violate the legal rights of his neighbor by creating a nuisance
which tends to destroy the value of the neighbor's property, endanger his neighWe think the border
bor's health, and detract from the enjoyment of a home, .
line between lawful and unlawful use has been crossed."
13. 308 Mich. 626, 14 N.W.2d 520 (1944), relief given was that the restaurant
owner had to provide someone to see the lines were orderly and did not obstruct
any doorways. Also see Annotation in 2 A.L.R.2d 437 (1948) on Attracting
People in such numbers as to obstruct access to the neighboring premises, as
Nuisance.
14. 15 Abb. N.C. (N.Y.) 250 (1884).
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It would not be said that the operation of a puppet show or restaurant is a
nuisance per se but they became nuisances per accidens by the circumstances
which resulted from their operation. In neither case did the defendant control
or possess any of the people that congregated before their place of business but
nonetheless a nuisance was created. It logically follows that it is not necessary
that one control or possess that which constitutes the nuisance. In the case at
bar the defendant did not own the migratory birds but he did own the pond which
initiated the nuisance by attracting the wild geese."
JERY S. EsTrS

15. See annotation in 2 A.L.R.2d 437 (1948).
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